«Please Let Us Know What We Should Do» (English Translation)

Full coverage (in German, partly translated into English).Switzerland's Colombia policy is suffering one blow after another. A few days after the liberation of Ingrid Betancourt, the Colombian President Uribe officially withdrew Switzerland's mandate to conduct negotiations. On Tuesday, things escalated still further: Bogotá announced that it was opening a criminal investigation into the activities of Swiss envoy Jean-Pierre Gontard. The crime: "concierto para delinquir" - membership in a criminal association. According to the Colombian district attorney, there is evidence that Gontard led a conspiracy or participated in one.

The step is all the more serious insofar as authorities in Latin America are normally very cautious about opening a formal criminal investigation: the mere receipt of a complaint is not sufficient. According to Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, e-mails found on the computer of the killed FARC commander Raúl Reyes suggest that Gontard delivered some $500,000 to the Marxist guerilla in 2001. In so doing, the Swiss envoy would have overstepped his function as "mediator."

As is so often the case when she is confronted by serious criticism, the head of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA), Michéline Calmy-Rey, has maintained an eloquent silence ever since the crisis with Colombia began. But she has dispatched her underlings before the press, in order roundly to deny all the accusations. M. Gontard "never delivered ransom payments," the EDA announced. The EDA is supposed to have signed a contract with Gontard's Geneva-based institute for mediation services in Colombia. The contract, the EDA claims, "rules out any acceptance of money and gifts or the demanding or, respectively, offering of benefits that serve illegal or corrupt purposes." According to deputy minister Anton Thalmann (number three in the EDA hierarchy), there is "no evidence whatsoever that Gontard betrayed his task as mediator."

Does Gontard Owe Money to the Terrorists?

Download the «Reyes-Emails» in their original Spanish version (PDF).The e-mail exchanges relevant to the Colombian investigation took place between August and the end of December in 2001. Die Weltwoche, which is in possession of extensive extracts from the Reyes e-mail communications, already cited the e-mails in its last issue (nr. 28/08). The documents do not only demonstrate the friendly relations that obtained between Gontard and the FARC leadership; they also suggest that Gontard played a role that went far beyond that of a neutral mediator. We here publish the most important passages, such that readers can judge for themselves.

On 27 August 2001, FARC "Foreign Minister" Raúl Reyes writes to the secretariat: "Along with Ricardo and Olga [two FARC commanders], carefully study the possibility of receiving from Jan Pierre the 500,000 dollars that he owes Jorge in a country other than Colombia and without witnesses." ("Jorge" is FARC commandante Mono Jojoy.)

In an e-mail sent to Jean-Pierre Gontard on 4 September, Reyes evokes his friendly sentiments toward Gontard and complains that "the Colombian government has prevented us from seeing one another in our camps as we have done so often in the past." The background to the remark: over the course of the peace negotiations, the Swiss professor had repeatedly visited the FARC and met with the most important FARC chiefs (including Alfonso Cano, who is currently the supreme commander of the FARC.) In the same e-mail to Gontard, Reyes also addresses the matter of the half million dollars: "Jorge sends you his warm regards and he proposes that one deliver the consignment [el encargo] in Panama at the end of the month, if you find this sensible, to someone he would indicate to you later on."

Gontard sends his response on 7 September: "I've received your messages. Thank you very much. We find that a very good suggestion. Please let us know what's necessary to put it into action, I hope by the last week in September." A discussion now takes place among the FARC bosses about how to carry out the delivery of the cash. It is decided that in the future one will speak of "appointment books" [agendas] that Gontard should deliver "in a briefcase with a combination lock." The "Marriot" in Panama City or the "Grand Hotel" in San José, Costa Rica are considered as possible locations for the delivery. Passwords are agreed upon for Gontard and the agent who is supposed to take the briefcase from him in the hotel lobby. ("He should say that he does not have any perfume, but rather a hand cream. Our comrade will say that they are both cosmetics.")

The delivery is delayed because of security concerns. It is not that the FARC has any doubts about Gontard, but they evidently fear that he could be shadowed. Shortly before Christmas, the transaction is finally completed. On 21 December 2001, "Rychy," the FARC man responsible for receiving the cash in Costa Rica, wishes his boss Reyes "a merry Christmas and a prosperous 2002" and reports that the transfer of the money has taken place: "The stuff from Gontard [Lo de Gontard] has been received without any major mishaps. It's been counted. It's all there….500 in all, and I await instructions on where to take them." E-mail exchanges over the course of the following weeks contain instructions on how the money is to be divided up and where it is to be stashed. With the help of the e-mails, the authorities were in fact able to seize some $480,000 in a private apartment in Costa Rica where the money evidently had been stored away.

Colombian authorities suspect that the half a million dollars was part of the ransom money with which the pharmaceutical firm Novartis purchased the freedom of two of its employees who had been taken hostage. They accuse Gontard of having personally delivered the cash.

But the purpose of the payment is not in fact clear from the e-mail exchanges. According to press reports, the Novartis employees Hector V. and Andrei B. were kidnapped in June 2001 in Bogotá by persons posing as police officers. In July 2001 - one year after the kidnapping, but six months before the delivery of the money - they were set free. According to the media reports, however, Novartis did not merely pay half a million, but rather eight million dollars.

In any case, we know that the half million dollars was paid after the release of the hostages. It is not entirely clear whether in the end Gontard himself delivered the money. The position of Novartis and the EDA is that the professor did not serve as money courier in the hostage affair.

In light of the e-mail exchanges, it is unclear how the EDA can profess to be so sure about this. The e-mails suggest otherwise. The mere fact that Gontard is mentioned so prominently in connection with the delivery of the cash, and that he himself gives his opinion on the matter, is enough to conclude that the EDA owes the public an explanation that goes well beyond the statements it has made up till now.

Why does Gontard "owe" the FARC-capo "Mono Jojoy" a half million dollars and why is he apparently prepared to deliver the money himself? What is the purpose of the payment? Is it part of the ransom money? Is it protection money that Novartis is paying to the terrorists? Or is the payment entirely unrelated to the hostage affair?

And more fundamentally: Did the EDA know that its envoy was involved in the delivery of half a million dollars? Did the EDA-chief, Micheline Calmy-Rey, know about it? Or was the EDA kept in the dark by its own envoy?

The EDA has let it be known that it was precisely informed about every step taken by Gontard. In the case in question, it is supposed to have "loaned" Gontard's contacts to a third party (Novartis). Furthermore, the EDA claims that it has carefully gone through that e-mail communications provided to it by Bogotá and that it has been able to clarify all the relevant questions in a declaration to the Colombian government. As the announcement of the criminal investigation makes clear, the Colombian judiciary has evidently come to different conclusions.

The Bias of Swiss Diplomacy

Just how one-sided Swiss diplomacy has been with respect to the FARC is also shown by another episode documented in the e-mail dossier. On 18 June 2007, Alfonso Cano sent an e-mail to his boss Manuel Marulanda - alias "Tirofijo" - concerning a terrible mishap. At the time, Cano was still a deputy of the since deceased FARC leader. "Good Evening, Comrade," Cano writes, "Due to a serious mix-up our unit was attacked by our own people who thought we were from the ELN [the National Liberation Army, a rival guerilla force]; the guards holding the representatives then killed eleven of the twelve hostages, because they thought they were being attacked by the army. This grave error is going to cause us enormous problems."

What had happened? In April 2002, in a daring action in the city of Cali, the FARC kidnapped twelve members of the regional parliament. The twelve men were taken off to the jungle by the narco-guerilla and since that time figured among the FARC's most prominent hostages along with Ingrid Betancourt. But in June 2007, just as the negotiations on a "humanitarian solution" seemed to be progressing and the Colombian government had released a FARC capo as a gesture of good will, the fatal blunder took place. The guards holding the hostages were mistakenly attacked by the FARC themselves. Believing that government troops were undertaking a rescue operation, they thereupon killed eleven of the twelve parliament members in cold blood. The hostages were shot in the back. (This is the FARC's preferred method of execution, since it always leaves open the option of claiming that hostages were killed "while trying to escape.")

The Helpers Provide Cover

Thanks to several laptop computers and hard drives that the Colombian army seized last May following a commando operation against Raúl Reyes, it is now possible precisely to reconstruct numerous of the crimes of the narco-guerilla.

The case of the murdered parliament members provides an instructive example of how the FARC have consciously manipulated world public opinion with disinformation. But what is especially serious from the Swiss point of view is that the Swiss foreign ministry - which as a rule treats official information from the Colombian government with reserve - eagerly took up the FARC propaganda. At the EDA, one apparently did not trust the constitutionally-elected government more than the terrorists.

On the very day of the massacre, FARC Chef "Tirofijo" posed three questions to his deputy Cano: "1. Can we still keep secret the described events among the guerrilleros and the civil population? 2. Are there army forces nearby, were there clashes? 3. Can we at least keep the thing secret until our comrades are free?" On the FARC chief's assessment, one has to delay the public being informed as long as possible, but one should have a communiqué ready just in case. If the second question can be answered positively, then the solution is very simple: one will simply blame the army. "And if all that doesn't work," Tirofijo concludes, "we will ask the families to forgive us by way of a political argument: namely, by making the government's postponement of the humanitarian exchange [intercambio humanitario] responsible for the matter."

As the FARC internal e-mail correspondence shows, over the next few days the FARC bosses engaged in a debate about optimal disinformation. On 22 June 2007, "Tirofijo" suggests claiming that the guards retreated with the hostages upon being attacked and that several people were killed while fleeing. "Comrade Timoschenko" (a known member of the secretariat) is inclined rather to blame the President without providing any further explanation. Alfonso Cano is for leaving open the identity of the attacking forces - "at least for the moment."

This is the version that is finally chosen. The parliament members were killed in crossfire during an attack by unknown troops, the FARC claim officially. On 15 August 2007, comrade Ivan Marquez "congratulates" the secretariat "for its exceptional handling of the case of the parliament members. Even the OAS [Organization of American States] admits that there was in fact an exchange of gunfire."

The Colombian government responded to the FARC's lies with a sharply-worded denial. But the group of international mediators - consisting of envoys from Switzerland, France and Spain - reserved judgment. The mediators condemned the killing of the hostages, but at the same time they called for the creation of an independent investigative commission and for the continuation of the "dialogue." Thereby the mediators made clear, in effect, that they trust the declarations of the government as little as those of the terrorist gang.

In an article that appeared on 13 September 2007, the Swiss daily Die Basler Zeitung summarized the attitude of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA) as follows: "The politicians kidnapped by the FARC were presumably shot by the rebels during an attack by unidentified forces. In response, Switzerland reminded the Colombian government of the necessity of negotiations and criticized army operations aimed at freeing the hostages." This is the line that the EDA under the leadership of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey has always defended: in Colombia, there is an "internal conflict" between two equal parties, the "rebels" and the security forces. On this account, the guerilla forces are not criminals, but a social problem, which has to be solved not with arms but by "dialogue." Following Calmy-Rey's démarche, Colombian President Uribe complained that Switzerland was placing the Colombian government on the same level as the FARC.

In fact, however, there is little to negotiate in Colombia. The government is directly elected by the people and it has to respect the country's laws and constitution. It cannot simply set free sworn enemies of the state, murderers, kidnappers, and drug traffickers. The second central demand of the FARC - renunciation of free trade and a new constitution on the Venezuelan model - likewise cannot be fulfilled by the government without betraying its electorate in the face of extortion. Furthermore, as is clear from the internal e-mail communications of the FARC, the terror organization is not in fact looking for any solution to the hostage crisis. It knows fully well that its demands cannot be met. From the start, the aim of the exercise was simply to use the "negotiations" to assure the organization a presence on the international stage.

The terrorists knew that the family members of the hostages would not speak badly of them and would be more likely rather to put pressure on the government. The FARC-friendly Venezuelan website www.aporrea.org, for example, took pleasure in citing the mild and sympathetic words that family members of Ingrid Betancourt had for her kidnappers. The comments of the families about the Colombian government, on the other hand, were critical or even hostile. This is hardly surprising: family members of kidnapping victims are typically prepared to do anything for their loved ones - even if this means having to cooperate with the perpetrators.

The cynical calculation of the FARC was right on the mark - and not only with respect to the family members of the hostages. The extortion effort was a great success. In Europe alone, some 200 support committees were formed, which militated for the release of Ingrid Betancourt and a "peaceful solution" of the "armed conflict in Colombia." According to the logic of the support committees, the terrorists are a sort of natural phenomenon: one might complain about them or even condemn them - but the whole responsibility for the problem is placed on the government. Switzerland played the role of mediator in this "humanitarian" tragicomedy. But the official Swiss envoy was in fact anything but neutral. The internal e-mail communications of the FARC suggest that Jean-Pierre Gontard may have offered his services to the kidnappers as an advisor on how "optimally" to use the hostages and even as money courier.

Ignorance or Lies

As the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo has reported, on 27 June 2008, just a few days before the army freed Ingrid Betancourt, a hostile encounter took place in Bogotá between Colombian President Álvaro Uribe and the two negotiators, Jean-Pierre Gontard and his French counterpart Noël Saez. Uribe brought up the e-mails with the two negotiators and sharply criticized them: "That's bad, very bad!" Uribe was particularly outraged by the meetings that the two "mediators" held with Reyes behind his back (meetings made public two weeks ago by Die Weltwoche).

The tense relationship between Switzerland and Colombia is nothing new. Officially, the Colombian government has always welcomed Switzerland's offers of mediation. At the same time, however, it has repeatedly warned Switzerland about what it regards as indirect support for the FARC. In response to protests by the Colombian government, the EDA has consistently denied that it tolerates the presence of a representation of the terror organization in Switzerland. Last May, an EDA spokesperson said, "There is no association or structure in Switzerland that is connected to the FARC." The e-mails, however, show that Lucas Gualdrón, the Lausanne-based FARC representative for Europe, played a central role in the negotiations between Gontard and the FARC leadership. The anti-terror experts of the Colombian police believe that more the eighty percent of FARC activities in Europe are handled by Gualdrón: including contacts to other terror groups and arms deals. In the confiscated emails, there is even a case documented in which Gontard serves as money courier, delivering $2000 from Reyes to Lucas Gualdrón.

There are only two explanations for the untenable denials being offered by the EDA: either Calmy-Rey's department did not know with whom its envoy Gontard was negotiating - or the public is being fed a lie.

Translation: John Rosenthal